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CHARACTERIZING PILOTS’ INTERACTIONS WITH THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM 
 
Alexandra E. Coso, Elizabeth S. Fleming, Dr. Amy R. Pritchett 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Atlanta, GA 
 
Collision avoidance on large transport aircraft involves many components: Air Traffic 
Control (ATC), the pilot, and the Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). This 
research explores pilots’ interactions with ATC, the environment, and TCAS. Collision avoidance 
reports from NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) were used to examine the 
encounter conditions surrounding collision avoidance incidents, including airspace, environment, 
and type of aircraft involved as well as pilot perceptions of the event. A coding scheme, developed 
in the early stages of this research, captured details regarding the traffic encounter, the role that 
ATC and TCAS played within the encounter, and the flight crew’s response. This analysis 
spanned TCAS-related ASRS incident reports from 2008 to 2010. The results illustrate that the 
availability and presentation of traffic information impact pilot agreement (and disagreement) as 
well as their compliance (and noncompliance) with ATC and TCAS issue maneuvers.  
The Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) delivers a two-stage advisory and avoidance 
maneuver to the pilot when it predicts loss of aircraft separation. The first stage, “Traffic Advisory” (TA), advises 
the pilot to a situation, but does not command (or authorize) an avoidance maneuver. The second stage, “Resolution 
Advisory” (RA), delivers a vertical avoidance maneuver (or limits on vertical speed) as required to maintain 
separation. These stages are supported by the TCAS traffic situation display (TSD), which provides a horizontal 
spatial presentation of nearby traffic as an aid to visual acquisition. 
When a pilot encounters a TCAS advisory, he or she has seconds to decide how to respond. The Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular 120-55B mandates that the pilot in command should maneuver as 
a TCAS RA directs unless the maneuver would endanger safe flight operations. It is important to note that pilots 
generally receive these RAs in high-density air traffic environments, and thus the time period leading up to, and 
spanning, a TCAS RA may also include many other events. For instance, a pilot may visually acquire another 
aircraft, which may or may not be the advised traffic, or a pilot may receive a traffic call-out from the controller. In 
the same instance, the pilot may overhear other communications on the ‘party-line’ or incur non-collision avoidance 
related events and alerts. The pilot also may receive air traffic instructions, which may be perceived as creating or 
resolving the traffic situation. Still, the Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 91.3 explains that a pilot in command 
has the ultimate authority and responsibility for the safe flight of the aircraft. Therefore, to extensively examine pilot 
interactions with TCAS, it is critical to examine not only the interactions themselves, but also the context of the air 
traffic environment in which pilots may be influenced by multiple, sometimes-competing factors. 
To explore the collision avoidance environment in context, reports from NASA’s Aviation Safety 
Reporting System (ASRS) were examined. The ASRS is a database containing voluntarily submitted reports filed by 
any personnel (including pilots) to describe incidents relating to potential aviation safety concerns. This database 
provides a unique method of observation and analysis regarding the perceptions of pilots during events involving 
TCAS. Earlier studies, which examined pilot reported use of TCAS via ASRS reports, identified an unexpected 
degree of reported noncompliance to TCAS RAs, a wide range of roles that the pilots attributed to TCAS, and 
potential reliance on the TCAS traffic situation display beyond its intended role as an aid to visual acquisition 
(Mellone, 1993; Pritchett, 2001; Rantanen, 2003). 
The purpose of this study is to provide a current review of ASRS reports with a more detailed analysis of 
the reported factors affecting a pilot’s response to TCAS RAs and ATC instructions. This paper summarizes a broad 
analysis of cases where pilots report agreement (or disagreement) and compliance (or noncompliance) with TCAS 
and ATC instructions. While the narratives provide a window into pilots’ perceptions of the events, it is important to 
note that the reports may reflect incomplete or inaccurate assessments of the events. Thus, the emphasis of this paper 
is on factors perceived by pilots and reported by pilots as influencing their responses. 
 
 
Method 
The ASRS database was accessed on July 20th, 2010, and relevant reports from January 2008 - April 2010 
were selected using a pre-defined list of collision avoidance-related search terms: TCAS, ACAS, collision 
avoidance, traffic advisory, resolution advisory, avoid a collision, evasive action, and mid-air collision. An example 
is shown in Figure 1. 
“I was crewing as [Second-In-Command] of an aircraft cruising at [Flight Level] 190. There was 
a traffic alert on TCAS. The alert was an amber target at +3,300, twelve o'clock and descending 
rapidly. Both pilots' eyes [were] on the situation. We noticed the aircraft moved in a zigzag. [We] 
received an RA to descend on TCAS. Noticed the aircraft was at +300 feet. Reported to ATC 
immediately that we had an RA and were descending. At the same time of reporting to ATC, I 
looked out for traffic and spotted a B-52 at our two o'clock position and less than one mile 
horizontal. Looks like if we hadn't taken evasive action there could have been a collision. We 
descended until the TCAS advised us that we were clear of conflict. We descended to 18,300. 
Once clear of traffic we climbed back to assigned altitude of [Flight Level] 190. I listened to ATC 
tell the other aircraft he should have been at block altitude of 22,000 to 20,000 feet, thank 
goodness for TCAS.” 
(ACN: 879699, 2010) 
 
Figure 1. The narrative is an example of an ASRS report found in the July 20th, 2010 search, describing a pilot’s 
interactions with TCAS. 
A coding scheme was developed and tailored to the analysis of collision avoidance events involving TCAS 
from a preliminary analysis of reports from 2009 and 2010. The coding scheme is comprised of four dimensions. 
The first, Encounter Conditions, identifies the weather conditions, the airport, the types of aircraft involved and their 
respective flight paths. Incident Description and Traffic Situation Awareness record which type of advisory (TA, RA 
or both) that the pilot reports acting upon, whether the pilot was impacted by the possible visual acquisition of 
another aircraft, ‘party-line’ communications, and/or air traffic controller call-outs of traffic, as well as the response 
of the pilot to the advisory. Finally, Perceptions of the Reporting Individual captures descriptions framing important 
factors as positive or negative, perceived communication breakdowns, and recommendations related to TCAS or 
collision avoidance (as shown in Table 1).  
Table 1. 
Coding Example of ACN: 879699, 2010 
Statement Incident 
Description 
Traffic 
Situation 
Awareness 
Perceptions 
There was a traffic alert on TCAS. TA   
The alert was an amber target at +3,300, twelve o'clock 
and descending rapidly 
 
Traffic Situation 
Display 
 
[We] received an RA to descend on TCAS Descend RA   
Reported to ATC immediately that we had an RA and 
were descending. 
Complied with 
RA 
  
At the same time of reporting to ATC, I looked out for 
traffic and spotted a B-52 at our two o'clock position and 
less than one mile horizontal. 
 After RA  
I listened to ATC tell the other aircraft he should have 
been at block altitude of 22,000 to 20,000 feet, thank 
goodness for TCAS. 
  
Positive 
Perception of 
TCAS 
Note: The dimensions of incident description, visual acquisition and perceptions were used to code the narrative 
itself, while encounter conditions were used to code information not included in the narrative. 
 
 
Two coders independently coded the 278 ASRS reports with an inter-rater reliability goal of 80 percent. 
Using Cohen’s kappa test, the resulting kappa value indicated 96% agreement, and coding disagreements between 
the raters were discussed until a consensus was reached. Subsequently, cases reporting noncompliance to 
instructions issued by TCAS or ATC were re-examined for common themes.  
Results 
As shown in Table 2 and Table 3, the reported incidents occurred in a variety of conditions and had a 
variety of outcomes in terms of reported compliance to TCAS RAs and ATC instructions. These categorizations 
were formed from the reports provided by the pilot, which in some cases were incomplete or may have been based 
on a biased perception of the situation. 
Table 2.  
Encounter conditions of the reported incidents 
Year (n=278) Respondent Aircraft Type (n=278) 
2008 109 39.20% Commercial Jet 28 10.10% 
2009 128 46.00% Commercial Fixed Wing 35 12.60% 
2010 (January – April) 41 14.80% Commercial Jet Low Range 31 11.20% 
Time of Day (n=262) Commercial Jet  
96 34.50% 
Early Morning (12:01am – 6:00am) 20 7.60% Medium & Short Range 
Morning (6:01am – 12:00pm) 60 22.90% Corporate Jet 51 18.40% 
Mid-Day (12:01pm to 6:00pm) 131 50.00% Military Aircraft 3 1.10% 
Evening (6:01pm to 12:00am) 51 19.50% Regional Jet 26 9.40% 
Weather (n=226) Small Personal Aircraft 8 2.90% 
IMC 31 13.70% Other Aircraft Type (n=183) 
Mixed 16 7.10% Commercial Jet 44 24.10% 
VMC 179 79.20% Corporate Jet 6 3.30% 
Phase of Flight (n=292, allowing for multiple flight 
phases per report) 
Helicopter 6 3.30% 
Military Aircraft 9 4.90% 
Climb 73 25.00% Regional Jet 3 1.60% 
Cruise 46 15.80% Small Personal Aircraft 50 27.30% 
Descent 44 15.10% Visual Flight Rules Aircraft 18 9.80% 
Approach 129 44.20% Unknown Aircraft 47 25.70% 
 
Table 3. 
Reported compliance to TCAS RAs and ATC instructions 
Reported Compliance to RA (n=248) 
Compliance 192 77.40% 
Partial Compliance 25 10.10% 
Noncompliance 19 7.70% 
Unspecified 12 4.80% 
Reported Compliance to ATC Instructions (n=78) 
Compliance 43 55.10% 
Partial Compliance 15 19.20% 
Noncompliance 20 25.60% 
 
 
 
Of the reported RA encounters, 77% (n=192) of pilots reported complying with the TCAS instructions, 
while reported noncompliance to an RA occurred in less than 8% of the reports (n=19). Statistical analysis revealed 
no statistically significant relationships between the conditions described in Table 2 (year, time of day, weather, 
respondent aircraft, other aircraft, and phase of flight) and reported compliance to either TCAS RAs or ATC 
instructions, described in Table 3. Examining compliance in more detail, many pilots reported being already clear of 
the conflict when the RA was delivered, and thus did not comply with its instructions. For example, one pilot noted, 
“I noticed that the TCAS depicted traffic was slightly behind us and to our left on my NAV display. The Captain 
immediately called something to the effect of, I’ve still got him, we’re clear” (ACN: 841821, 2009). Others reported 
using visual acquisition as justification for reported RA noncompliance: “I elected, with the Captain’s concurrence, 
to keep the descent so as to keep the MD80 in sight” (ACN: 838285, 2009). In a few cases (15% of reported RA 
noncompliance, n=3) pilots viewed the TCAS instruction as directing them into traffic. “Just then our TCAS gave an 
RA, ‘Descend, crossing, descend.’ The Captain said something to the effect of, ‘I’m not doing that. He’s descending, 
we’ll descend right into him” and did not follow the TCAS RA” (ACN: 854982, 2009). In 10% (n=25) of the 
analyzed reports, pilots conveyed partially complying with an RA. For these cases, pilots typically performed the 
vertical maneuver instructed by a TCAS RA, but added a horizontal component. These narratives suggest that the 
pilots believed their response was appropriate, and it followed standard procedure: “As the Pilot Flying, the First 
Officer appropriately initiated a descending left-hand turn away from target per the aural and visual guidance from 
the TCAS” (ACN: 802766, 2008). 
Chi-square tests revealed that the relationship between reported compliance to TCAS RAs and any 
awareness of the location of other aircraft (i.e., from either the TCAS traffic situation display or visually out the 
window) is statistically significant, (χ2(2, N = 233) = 10.990, p < 0.01). Additionally, there exists a relationship 
between reported compliance and visual acquisition, without mention of the TCAS traffic situation display (χ2(2, N 
= 233) = 7.291, p < 0.05). As shown in Table 4, pilots reported 31 instances of maneuvering after receiving the 
precautionary TCAS TA and before receiving the RA. In these cases, pilots reported disconnecting the autopilot, 
performing a horizontal maneuver, or performing a vertical maneuver. For example, “Pilot not flying reduced the 
scale of our TCAS display, and seeing traffic below, we reduced our descent rate to 300 FPM” (ACN: 834304, 
2009). During these maneuvers, pilots reported having awareness of the other aircraft 84% of the time. The 
relationship between a pilot’s decision to maneuver on a TCAS TA and their reported awareness of the other 
aircraft, on the traffic situation display or visually is significant, (χ2(1, N = 278) = 6.952, p < 0.01). In the situation 
where a pilot reported maneuvering on a TCAS TA, it is likely he or she reported having awareness of the location 
of another aircraft.  
Table 4. 
Pilot reported response correlated to when a TCAS advisory was received 
Reported Timing of Pilot Response to an Event (n=230) 
Pilot Maneuvered Before a TCAS Advisory 23 10.00% 
Pilot Maneuvered After a TA and Before an RA 31 13.48% 
Pilot Maneuvered After an RA 176 75.22% 
 
In 78 of the narratives, pilots reported receiving collision avoidance instructions from ATC and in 26% of 
these reports (n = 20) pilots reported not complying with those instructions (shown in Table 3). Many pilots 
explained that they chose to follow a TCAS RA, which conflicted with air traffic instructions, and expressed a belief 
that the air traffic instructions would not resolve the traffic situation. For example, “After we began the climb, ATC 
said to increase descent. Had we followed his instructions versus the TCAS RA, it would have ended in a midair 
collision” (ACN: 852998, 2009). In some cases, pilots described relying on their awareness of other aircraft, based 
on the TCAS traffic situation display or visual acquisition. “Traffic was depicted on TCAS, as we were converging 
traffic continued to head directly towards us and climbing up to our altitude. ATC issued a turning and climbing 
clearance to avoid conflicting traffic. I refused that clearance as I felt that would have caused a near midair or 
worse” (ACN: 862593, 2009). Cases of “partial compliance” to air traffic instructions were also noted when pilots 
began to follow air traffic instructions but then received and complied with a TCAS RA(19%, n = 15). In several 
 
 
cases, the pilot chose to continue an ATC commanded turn while also following the RA vertical command. “About 
30 seconds went by before ATC told us to turn a heading of 270. I started the turn and the TCAS gave an RA to 
descend at a rate of 1500-2000 FPM. I turned off the autopilot, pulled the power levers to idle, and descended at a 
rate of 2000 FPM while continuing the turn” (ACN: 849888, 2009). 
As previously stated, collision avoidance cannot be examined by considering only the TCAS advisories and 
instructions or ATC traffic call outs and instructions. Throughout a collision avoidance situation, a pilot may receive 
and interpret the information presented (from their environment, by ATC advisories, or by TCAS advisories) and 
from that information, he or she may determine an avoidance maneuver is necessary. In the cases where a pilot 
chose to maneuver prior to receiving an RA or instructions from the controller, there is a high likelihood that the 
pilot had previously established awareness of another aircraft via the traffic situation display (χ2(2, N = 221) = 
7.657, p < 0.03 and (χ2(2, N = 256) = 10.403, p < 0.01). For the instances when a pilot receives an RA, statistical 
analysis suggests, he or she will be more likely to comply with the TCAS instructions if he or she was first notified 
of the potential collision by TCAS, through either the RA itself or a TA ( χ2(4, N = 229) = 14.059, p < 0.01). 
Finally, if a pilot is directed to a traffic situation by either ATC or TCAS, they will most likely delay any response 
until prompted by an RA or ATC instructions (χ2(4, N = 227) = 22.739, p < 0.01 and χ2(2, N = 267) = 9.266, p < 
0.01). 
Pilots also frequently provided their assessments of the performance of TCAS and ATC (43%, n = 120), as 
shown in Table 5. In the case of TCAS, pilots focused their negative comments on the traffic situation display and 
their assumption of an error in the TCAS logic. For instance, one pilot explained that “it was very hard to see [the 
other aircraft’s] altitude as it was all cluttered together [on the traffic situation display]” (ACN: 840426, 2009). 
Another pilot described his experience with TCAS, “Descending into an airplane that is clearly descending? TCAS 
software clearly did not give appropriate guidance, nor did it self-correct when the initial guidance was so clearly 
wrong” (ACN: 854982, 2009). Other pilots discussed feeling “overloaded” by the TCAS warnings. “It was hard to 
hear instructions from ATC from the numerous RA callouts of the airplane and TA callouts which were shouting 
quite loud in our headsets – which made it difficult to understand the instructions given” (ACN: 773537, 2008). 
Conversely, many narratives cited TCAS as the system that saved the day. “The TCAS was what prevented this from 
being a potential midair” (ACN: 802820, 2008). 
Table 5. 
Pilot perceptions of air traffic and TCAS performance 
Perceptions of the Collision Avoidance System (N=278) 
Element 
Type of 
Perception  Sub Category 
% of 
Sample 
ATC 
Positive (1.08% of all reports, n=3) 
  Credit for save 100% 
Negative (35.25% of all reports, n=98) 
  
Controller Assigned Collision Course 19.39% 
Lack of Traffic Call 16.33% 
Controller Error 12.24% 
Disinterest by the Controller 15.31% 
Lack of Situational Awareness 19.39% 
Other 17.35% 
TCAS 
Positive (8.63% of reports, n=24) 
  Credit for save 100% 
Negative (7.91% of all reports, n=22) 
  
Unclear Information on TSD  13.64% 
TCAS Assigned Collision Course 50.00% 
Pilot was Overloaded 9.09% 
Other 27.27% 
 
 
 
The overall perception of ATC as described in these ASRS reports was comparatively negative. Thirty-five 
percent of the analyzed reports included negative comments from the pilots regarding his or her interactions with the 
controller. Within these responses, pilots reported perceiving that the instructions provided by the air traffic 
controller, if complied with, would have resulted in a mid-air collision. These comments were common among the 
reports also describing noncompliance to air traffic instructions. Other pilots discussed the failure of the controller to 
provide traffic call-outs prior to the incident. “I called the Tower after landing and told them it would have been 
helpful to get an advisory upon initial contact so we could have been more prepared. TCAS system was the only 
alert we had as Tower told us of traffic after the traffic had passed” (ACN: 861931, 2009). Additionally, pilots 
noted instances where the air traffic controller appeared disinterested, unaware or not concerned about the traffic 
situation. “It did not seem that the Tower Controller was very concerned about the event” (ACN: 862312, 2009). 
Only three reports included positive comments, with one report stating “THANK THE CONTROLLER and see if it 
could be counted as a ‘save’” (ACN: 858151, 2009).  
Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to begin to explore the factors which affect pilots’ agreement (or 
disagreement) and compliance (or noncompliance) with collision avoidance instructions. In an analysis of ASRS 
reports relating to collision avoidance and TCAS, pilots most often reported compliance with ATC and TCAS 
instructions. However, there were still many reports of noncompliance and partial compliance. In a large number of 
these cases, pilots perceived his or her actions as appropriate and aligned with standard procedure. Through further 
examination of these instances, the qualitative and quantitative findings indicate that pilots may perceive TCAS and 
ATC issued collision avoidance maneuvers as placing their flight into a near miss situation. Pilots also criticized 
ATC for not issuing traffic call-outs in a timely manner. In addition, the results suggest the information on the traffic 
situation display may be misleading. For instance, pilots’ awareness of a second aircraft on the traffic situation 
display impacted their response to the potential collision. The information presented to a pilot about a collision 
avoidance situation is especially crucial in their decision making process. Both visual awareness and whether the 
pilot was directed to the potential incident by ATC, TCAS, or their environment were found to have a direct effect 
on a pilot’s decision to maneuver.  
In the complex environment which surrounds the collision avoidance system, it is necessary to understand 
the factors which affect a pilot’s response to collision avoidance advisories and instructions. This study focuses on 
encounter conditions, traffic situation awareness, and other factors to begin to characterize patterns within pilots’ 
interactions with TCAS and ATC. Future work in this area should consider a wider range of first-hand narratives, 
including those from the National Transportation Safety Board. Additionally, the results presented suggest further 
research is needed to determine different methods for presenting information in this dynamic and time-sensitive 
collision avoidance system.  
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